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study has implications to the strict policy implementation of the provi-
sions of the 1991 Local Government Code of the Philippines, The Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and other pertinent laws in order to
improve the transparency, integrity and accountability of public officials
not only in southern Philippines but also in the entire country.
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INTRODUCTION
Good governance sets the normative standards of
development. It fosters participation, ensures transparency,
demands accountability, promotes efficiency, and upholds
the rule of law in economic, political and administrative
institutions and processes. It is a hallmark of political
maturity  but also a requisite for growth and poverty reduc-
tion, for there are irreducible minimum levels of gover-
nance needed for large-scale investment to occur and for
social programs to be supported (www.neda.gov.ph). The
empowerment of local officials is enshrined in the 1991
local government code. However, a lot of studies signifi-
cantly point out the proliferation of corruption in the local
government units  after the devolution of power as man-
dated in the said code (Amorado, 2007).
Corruption has been defined as the misuse or abuse of
public office for private gain (Klitgaard, Abaroa and Parris,
2000). It involves members of government and the private
sector. Robert Klitgaard, as cited by Batalla (2000),  asserts
that corruption  comes in several forms and consists of a
wide array of illicit behaviors including bribery, extortion,
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Graft and Corruption Practices




This study aims to examine the graft and corruption
practices among selected public officials in south-
ern Philippines. The study is qualitative in nature
making use of case study method in which an in-
depth analysis of primary data obtained from eight
informants, four of whom are town mayors and their
four incumbent municipal treasurers, is employed.
The findings revealed that the mayor informants got
elected through vote buying and bribery. Politics and
family matters intersect as informants are supported
by their families during election who used guns, gold
and goons to ensure election victory. The clannish
nature of the community finds expression also in the
selection of relatives in municipal employment and
in accessing municipal resources. The most preva-
lent corruption practice disclosed by the informants
is amassing the internal revenue allotment (IRA) for
personal purposes in order to recover the huge
amount of money spent during election. Other   types
of corruption practices also include falsification of
documents, nepotism, bribery, kickbacks, and eva-
sion of public bidding. These public officials also
do not seem to perform official duties in their towns
as they live outside of their municipalities. Inter-
agency involvement of corruption among different
government agencies in the areas studied are also
uncovered.  Moreover, the perceived negative ef-
fects of corruption are manifested in the poor deliv-
ery of the community’s basic social services in health,
water supply, education, and security protection. Cor-
ruption also adversely affects the construction of
community infrastructure facilities and the establish-
ment of an equitable and solid economic base. The
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fraud, nepotism , graft, speed money, pilferage,
theft, embezzlement, falsification of records,
kickbacks, influence-peddling, and campaign
contribution”. According to the 1999 United
Nation Development Program (UNDP), corrup-
tion is anti-development because it goes against
efficiency, social equity and welfare. The full
development of national system of communica-
tion, transportation, trade and commerce, all of
which are essential to economic development, is
adversely affected because of the diversion and
misdistribution of domestic and foreign public
funds.
The Transparency International 2010 report
says that the level of corruption in the Philippines
has worsened in the last three years, with the
country being perceived as 12th most corrupt in a
field of 178 nations. Furthermore, 69% of those
surveyed said that they believe that corruption has
increased within the last three years. Transparency
International also estimates that 20 percent of the
budget is lost to corruption annually. Given a
budget of 1.645 trillion for 2011, the country
stands to lose P329 billion in taxpayer’s money by
year’s end.
The Philippines is continuously viewed as
having serious corruption problems in interna-
tional stage. In a survey conducted by the Hong
Kong-based consultancy firm Political and Eco-
nomic Risk Consultancy in 2011, the county
garnered a score of 8.9, worse than its rating of
8.25 in 2010. This ranked the Philippines as third
most corrupt nation in Southeast Asia (www.abs-
cbnews.com, 2011)
In the Muslim-dominated Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) observations would
indicate that it is saddled with an oversized, demor-
alized and mostly incompetent bureaucracy. People
in the government services are hired for their
political connections and family ties rather than
their skills. Since its creation, ARMM has received
generous financial infusions from Manila. It is
estimated that each of ARMM provinces gets one
billion pesos annually from the national govern-
ment in the form of Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA), congressional initiative allocations and
countrywide development funds (CDF). According
to the Commission on Audit reports, ARMM— the
poorest region in the country, with the worst social
services-has little to show for this money. In addi-
tion, millions of pesos worth of funds remained
unaccounted for (Vitug, 1996).
In terms of transparency, accountability and
governance performance, ARMM is unsatisfactory.
In the ARMM Regional Government (ARG),
about 82 percent of the total budgetary allocation
is spent on employee salaries and benefits, making
it the largest employment agency in the area.
Many barangay lacks barangay hall; absentee
employee and even mayors seem to be the norm.
The homes of municipal mayors and barangay
chairs are often the de facto centers of local gover-
nance. In many municipalities, only the mayor and
treasurer have knowledge of the IRA, and funds
which, by law, are reserved for development
activities, are in fact used in any manner the mayor
decides. Public funds are dispensed as private
funds; appointments to key positions are based
mainly on kinship; and citizens expect local execu-
tives to provide free services (Calavan et al., 2004)
In Lanao Del Sur, one of the provinces of the
ARMM, graft and corruption practices are wide-
spread. Based on the Commission on Audit Execu-
tive Summary 2007 report on the province, the
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commission found out rampant irregularities
practiced by the provincial government officials.
Some of these are absence of public bidding in the
procurement of supplies and equipments, disburse-
ment of money is not supported by vouchers and
unliquidated cash advances for travelling expenses
of officials (www.coa.gov.ph, 2007)
The COA report mentioned earlier only elabo-
rated on the forms and nature of corruption and
financial mismanagement of the resources of
Lanao Del Sur and ARMM region. However, the
factors that account for these corrupt practices in
the region have never been contextualized. Thus
this angle needs to be explored further to shed
light on the reasons why corruption pervades in a
Maranao-dominated community and the types or
forms and procedures of corruption that actually
happened during the incumbency of the selected
public officials in some municipalities of Lanao Del
Sur. This study is significant in examining the
transparency, accountability and good governance
in  selected towns in Lanao Del Sur.
This study aims to identify and describe the graft
and corruption practices among selected public
officials in Lanao Del Sur. Particularly, this study
examines  the following: the socio demographic
profile of the key informants, the role of kinship
system in the political involvement of the infor-
mants, the informants view on corruption, the
graft and corruption practices done by local govern-
ment officials, the perceived effects of graft and
corruption practices in their municipality, and the
recommendations of the informants to lessen the
corruption practices in the locality.
This study highlights Homans’ exchange theory
which advances propositions about the nature of
exchanges in people’s interaction that promotes
further exchanges as well as   Merton’s strain
theory. These two theories would explain the
engagement of graft and corruption practices
among the informants in the study. The funda-
mental propositions of   George Homans’ ex-
change theory are the following: The Success
Proposition- states that “For all actions taken by
persons, the more often a particular action of a
person is rewarded, the more likely the person is to
perform that action” (Homans, 1974:16)”;  The
Stimulus Proposition- argues  that “if in the past
occurrence of a particular stimulus, or set of
stimuli, has been the occasion on which a person’s
action has been rewarded, then the more similar
the present stimuli are to the past ones, the more
likely the person is to take the action, or some
similar action” (Homans, 1974: 23). On the other
hand, the Value Proposition- states that “the more
valuable to a person is the result of his action, the
more likely he is to perform the action” (Homans,
1974:25).
Furthermore, his Deprivation-Satiation Proposi-
tion states that “The more often in the recent past
a person has received a particular reward, the less
valuable any further unit of that reward becomes
for him” (Homans, 1974:29). There are also two
cases involved in The Aggression-Approval Proposi-
tion.  The first is the Proposition A: “When a
person’s action does not receive the reward he expected,
or receives punishment he did not expect, he will be
angry; he becomes more likely to perform aggressive
behavior, and the result of such behaviour becomes more
valuable to him” (Homans, 1974:37). The second is
Proposition B: “When a person’s action receives the
reward he expected, especially a greater reward than he
expected, or does not receive punishment he expected, he
will be pleased; he becomes more likely to perform
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approving behaviour, and the result of such behaviour
becomes more valuable” (Homans, 1974:43).
Lastly, the Rational Proposition which states
that, “In choosing between alternative actions, a person
will choose that one for which, as perceived by him at the
time, the value, V, of the result, multiplied by the
probability, p , of getting the result, is greater”
(Homans, 1974:43). Out of the six propositions
being mentioned, only four were used as basis for
explaining the practice of graft and corruption in
the selected municipalities of Lanao Del Sur. The
following propositions are: the Success Proposition,
Stimulus Proposition, Value Proposition, and
Aggression-Approval Proposition.
Figure 1.Schematic Diagram Used in the Study
On the other hand, Merton’s strain theory
looks at deviance as the characteristics of
behaviours of individuals which violate group
norms (including cultural mores and moral stan-
dards). The deviance, in order to be properly
labelled, must induce a negative response from the
group. The second piece of this definition is actu-
ally the most important in that; without the
negative reaction, the behaviour would not be
considered deviant. Because deviance is found
naturally within society, Merton believes that it was
society itself which causes it. Further, Merton
believes that when societal norms, or socially
accepted goals (such as the American Dream), place
pressure on the individual to conform, they force
the individual to either work within the structure
society has produced, or instead, become members
of a deviant subculture (Merton, 1938). Therefore
the conditions governing social interactions to-
gether with the cultural norms of society (example
strong familism) define the proclivity of the infor-
mants to engage in corruption as articulated by the
succeeding diagram and the explanations that
follow. (see figure 1)
Figure 1 presents the variables in the study. The
socio demographic profile is linked to the following
three variables: role of kinship system in politics,
key informants’ view of corruption and graft and
corruption practices. The role of kinship system in
politics is crucial because it is the kin of the key
informants who decides who will run in politics. It
is very important that the family of the politicians
(key informants) must be united so that there will
be a great chance of winning in the election. The
informants’ view on corruption is linked to his
own perspective and personal experiences. Graft
and corruption practices are also connected with
the informants because their lifestyles would be
reflective of their involvement or non-involvement
in the act.
The role of kinship system is linked  to graft and
corruption practices because when the mayors win
in the election, they must repay the favor they
owed to their relatives. At this point also, Homans’
exchange propositions are relevant specifically on
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the following: success proposition, value proposi-
tion, stimulus proposition, and aggression-approval
propositions   (notably, proposition B).
The perceived effects of graft and corruption
have impacts to the community especially in the
delivery of basic social services to the people
because corruption is anti-development: it adversely
affects the prosperity of the community. But
corruption needs a solution. Some recommenda-
tions from the informants to lessen corruption
practices in their respective locality are expected in
order to improve local governance.
RESEARCH METHODS
The study was conducted using a qualitative
approach employing mainly case study and observa-
tion methods. Primary information were gener-
ated from the in depth-interviews of the infor-
mants. Observation method was used by the
researchers to check and verify the presence of
community facilities, the lifestyles of the municipal
mayor and municipal treasurer informants and the
actual situation of the selected municipalities. The
researchers obtained  data from 8 selected local
government officials who assumed office since
2004 up to the present. They were selected using
snowball sampling technique. The researchers
ensured the observance of research ethics in the
conduct of the study through informed consent,
respect and protection of the identity of the infor-
mants.
The data were analyzed using content/thematic
analysis of the transcripts of the case study data.
This is a technique for making inferences by
objectively and systematically identifying specified
characteristics of messages (Ole Holsti, 1969). The
researchers thematically analyzed the data based on
the key ideas drawn from the responses of the key
informants.
DISCUSSIONS AND RESULTS
1. SOCIO DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE
INFORMANTS
The average age of the mayor informants is 52
and 49 for the municipal treasurers. Among the 4
mayor informants, 3 are males and 1 is female.
The same distribution is noted among the 4
treasurer informants which may indicate  the
emerging role of Maranao Muslim  women in
politics and key positions in public office.  The
mayors do not have previous work experience in
the government service unlike the treasurers that
are mandated by the Local Government Code to
obtain a background in financial management.
Election cost in Lanao del Sur is very expensive
with an estimated average of P42.3 million per
mayor candidate. This amount is mainly used for
vote buying and bribing the Commission of Elec-
tion (COMELEC) officials and financing support-
ers (the details of which are elaborated in the
succeeding discussions). The mayors are allowed by
law to hold office for 3 terms and each term  has a
duration of 3 years. On the average, the mayors in
this study have served for  2 terms ( 6 years) while
their  municipal treasurers have been in this
position for around 8 years which suggests their job
capability.
The mayors have a mean monthly income of
P37, 187.00 and P29, 983.00 for the municipal
treasurers. Their salary depends on the classifica-
tion of their municipalities. Both the salary of
municipal mayor and municipal treasurer is stipu-
lated and fixed by law under R.A No. 6758 known
as “An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation
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and Position Classification System In the Govern-
ment and For Other Purposes”. The average
monthly income of the mayors, which include the
income of their spouses, is more than twice   the
mayors’ monthly salary ( P86,867.00) while their
treasurers earned  about half   (P43,193.00). Trans-
lating their income into a living standard, their
monthly financial resources obtained from legiti-
mate means could only  warrant them to enjoy a
modest  life .
 However, in terms of material possessions
which are visible to the public like houses and
vehicles, the 4 mayors own an average of 4 luxury
cars estimated to have an average  cost of
P7,570,000 million. One of the mayors even own 6
cars. They also typically possess 4 houses and lots.
In fact, one of them has 5 houses; 1 in his own
municipality and 4 in other cities.
The 4 treasurers also typically  own  2 expensive
cars which could be valued at P3.2 million. Aside
from cars, they also have  an average of 2 houses.
These suggest that the informants live a comfort-
able life which could be monitored through their
declaration of assets and liabilities and lifestyle
check as mandated by the law on R.A. No. 6713
also known as “An Act Establishing A Code Of
Conduct And Ethical Standards For Public Offi-
cials And Employees, To Uphold The Time-Hon-
ored Principle Of Public Office Being A Public
Trust, Granting Incentives And Rewards For
Exemplary Service, Enumerating Prohibited Acts
And Transactions And Providing Penalties For
Violations Thereof And For Other Purposes”. The
section eight of Republic Act 6713 which states
that:
“Statements and Disclosure. - Public officials and
employees have an obligation to accomplish and
submit declarations under oath of, and the public has
the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth
and financial and business interests including those
of their spouses and of unmarried children under
eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.
(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and
Financial Disclosure. - All public officials and
employees, except those who serve in an honorary
capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers,
  Source:  Fieldwork Data Gathered from the Informants Conducted in  May to July, 2012
TABLE 1. PROFILE OF KEY  INFORMANTS
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shall file under oath their Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of
Business Interests and Financial Connections and
those of their spouses and unmarried children
under eighteen (18) years of age living in their
households.”
2. ROLE OF FAMILY IN CORRUPTION
The 4 mayor key informants have also relatives,
either by blood or marriage- related,    who are in
politics. There are social and political functions of
kinship in Lanao del Sur since politicians need a
huge support of different families in order to
increase their chances in winning in elections. The
families expand their political alliances through
marriage to someone belonging to a big family.
Expansion of family networks through affinal and
blood ties ensure financial support from relatives
during election.
It is also revealed that the family has a strong
influence in the informants’ decision to run for
public office. It is impossible for a politician in this
province to win without the support of his/her
family. If there are a lot of men in the family, the
opposing party cannot just simply outsmart the
rival. Men are needed especially during voting
period when violence cannot be avoided. Some
people tend to control the polling precincts.  Men
supporters of the politicians sometimes do not
allow voters who do not vote for their candidates
to enter the precincts, thus male power is needed
to safeguard election victory.
Another thing to be considered upon entering
the world of politics in Lanao Del Sur is the capac-
ity of each local candidate to put up huge amount
of money. As mentioned earlier, a mayor candidate
has to spend million of   pesos to ensure winning,
30 to 58 million pesos or  P42.3 million on the
average. This money was mainly used in vote
buying activities, mobilization of election support-
ers and even in the bribery of the election officials
in the province.  It has to be noted that in section
261 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philip-
pines, entitled “Election Offense”, specifically states
that vote buying is strictly prohibited.
“Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty
of an election offense:
a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. -
(1) Any person who gives, offers or promises
money or anything of value, gives or promises
any office or employment, franchise or grant,
public or private, or makes or offers to make an
expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an
expenditure to be made to any person, associa-
tion, corporation, entity, or community in order
to induce anyone or the public in general to
vote for or against any candidate or withhold his
vote in the election, or to vote for or against any
aspirant for the nomination or choice of a
candidate in a convention or similar selection
process of a political party.
(2) Any person, association, corporation, group or
community who solicits or receives, directly or
indirectly, any expenditure or promise of any
office or employment, public or private, for any
of the foregoing considerations.”
The two researchers in this study who are
residents in the province witnessed the rampant
vote buying during elections. Mayors give money in
the range of P3,000 – P8,000 per voter, while a
congressional  candidate gives P2,000 –P3,000
pesos. It is estimated that during elections, a voter
can collect P10,000 to P12,000 from the candi-
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dates. The amount spent during election by the
mayor key informants  is also in violation of
Section 13 of Republic Act 7166 known as “An Act
Providing For Synchronized National And Local
Elections And For Electoral Reforms” which
stipulates the following provisions:
“Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political
Parties. - The agreement amount that a candidate or
registered political party may spend for election
campaign shall be as follows:
For candidates. - Ten pesos (P10.00) for President
and Vice-President; and for other candidates Three
Pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in
the constituency where he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That a candidate without any
political party and without support from any political
party may be allowed to spend Five Pesos (P5.00) for
every such voter; and…” (R.A 7166)
3. VIEWS OF CORRUPTION
Corruption can come in various forms. The
mayors admitted that it can be in the form of
amassing the IRA (Internal Revenue Allotment) to
recoup the money they spent during election. This
is in preparation for the next election or this could
be a source of personal income. The IRA, accord-
ing to Section 284 of the Local Government Code
of the Philippines (RA 7160), is a local
government’s share of revenues from the national
government. It is largely based on land area and
population. As further stated in Section 286 of the
same code, “the release of the IRA shall be automati-
cally released without need of any further action, and as
the case may be, on quarterly basis within five (5) days
after the end of each quarter, and which shall not be
subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by
the national government for whatever purpose”. The
intended fund of the 80% IRA is classified as
General Funds, where the salary of the municipal
employees, maintenance and operating expenses
(MOOE), payrolls, and others are withdrawn. The
20% IRA is intended for development projects as
required by the same law, again as stated in Section
287 of Local Government Code. It is the task of
Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG) to furnish a copy of the development plan
projects.
On the other hand, the treasurers view corrup-
tion as a way of stealing the IRA. Aside from this
act, other corruption practices include bribing the
COMELEC  and Commission on Audit (COA)
officials to facilitate anomalous transaction or using
the funds of Local Government Units ( LGUs) for
personal expenditures.
The study also shows that there are advantages
and disadvantages of corruption. The mayors view
the direct benefits of corruption to their family
and political career. Aside from recovering their
investment or the money spent during election,
corruption gives prestige to the mayors including
their families because it provides them with family
honor, luxurious lifestyle and power. The treasurers
identified the disadvantages of corruption in the
promotion of community welfare. According to
them, corruption retards the economic develop-
ment of the community because problems of
poverty, access and  provision of social services,
infrastructure facilities and security concerns  are
not given priority.
Why do the informants resort to corruption?
The treasurers said it is because the mayors used it
as a strategy for recovering election financial
investment and in preparation for the next elec-
tion.. The success and stimulus  propositions of
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Homans’ exchange theory can be aptly seen in the
actions of the mayor informants as also validated
by their corresponding treasurers.  Election be-
comes an economic investment of every politician
in anticipation of the reward (whether money,
power, recognition, prestige) which they get though
the IRA.
 Also, the treasurers added that the mayors tried
all possible means to get them to power not only
through vote buying but also in bribing
COMELEC officials. Merton’s strain theory is also
useful to analyze the motivations of the mayors
who use all possible illegitimate means to get their
goals.  The treasurers further stressed  that corrup-
tion is the way of governance in the province of
Lanao Del Sur which is also a microcosm of corrup-
tion in the whole government bureaucracy.
4. THE PRACTICE OF CORRUPTION
There are procedures in undertaking corruption
as revealed by the treasurers. They admitted that
they usually prepare manipulated/fake documents
like payrolls, vouchers, and disbursements to
liquidate the municipal expenses taken from the
IRA. The other practice is to pay fixers to process
the liquidation. It is noted that the treasurers play
a big role in the preparations of the papers in
order for the IRA to be released and in the   dis-
bursement process. They are the ones also to hand
in to the mayor the extra amount left in the 80%
general appropriations fund and usually the full
amount of the 20% development fund. These
practices are in violation of the Revised Penal Code
of the Philippines, Section four, article 171 which
states that:
“Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or
notary or ecclesiastic minister. — The penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee,
or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any
of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting,
signature or rubric;
2. Making any alteration or intercalation in a
genuine document which changes its meaning;
3. Issuing in an authenticated form a document
purporting to be a copy of an original document
when no such original exists, or including in such
a copy a statement contrary to, or different from,
that of the genuine original”
The mayors admitted the existence of rampant
corruption in their municipalities. This is done in
the form of spending personally the IRA and the
budget allocated for local and national projects.
The other corruption practice is done through the
sharing of IRA by the mayor and selected munici-
pal officials (elected and appointed like the treasur-
ers and municipal engineers) which is an inter-
agency arrangement. In extreme cases, acquiring
personally the release of 80% and 20% of the IRA
by pocketing it is also another form. Getting the
remaining funds of the implemented projects is
also another practice. These corruption practices
are in violation of the R.A 3019 also known as
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which stipu-
lates  that:
“Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall consti-
tute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any
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gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself
or for any other person, in connection with any
contract or transaction between the Government and
any other part, wherein the public officer in his
official capacity has to intervene under the law.”
Most of the municipal mayors practice malversa-
tion of public funds which is not only a corrupt
practice but also as criminal offense as specified  in
Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philip-
pines and amended through R.A. It states that:
“Art. 217.     Malversation of public funds or prop-
erty. — Presumption of malversation. — Any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate
shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence,
shall permit any other person to take such public
funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall other-
wise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation
of such funds or property”
.
The study also revealed that the key informants
are not conducting public bidding where there are
infrastructure projects to be implemented and in
purchasing government supplies. Treasurer infor-
mants bluntly admitted that they personally chose
the private contractors to the infrastructure
projects. Under R.A. No. 9184 also known as
“Government Procurement Act”,  Public Bidding is
required to promote transparency in procurement
process and provide equal opportunity to private
contractors. The illegal practices done by the key
informants fall under R.A 3019, section 3, para-
graph (g) which states that:
“Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers- In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall consti-
tute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any
contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disad-
vantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.”
Corruption like evasion of public bidding,
falsification of documents, diversion of funds  were
the common forms of corruption  identified by
Klitgaard in his study  (Batalla, 2000) and that  of
Cahiles et al. (2011). Since the informants were not
caught nor penalized  in doing these illegal acts and
were successful in getting money from the public
treasury, they repeatedly performed this action
because of the reward ( Homans’ Success Proposi-
tion). Also, because  the mayors wanted to recoup
their election expenses and they could not do so
under legitimate channels,  the only way to do that
is by breaking established norms  and by abuse of
power (Merton’s strain theory).
5. PEOPLE INVOLVED IN CORRUPTION
Graft and corruption practices of the local
government officials need the participation of
other officials and agencies. In practice, the usual
people who are involved are  the municipal trea-
surer for the withdrawal of the IRA while the
municipal planning officer and the municipal
engineer are needed for the preparation of re-
quests for project proposals. Once the provincial
and regional offices approved the project  propos-
als, the possibility of getting kickbacks is already
assured. Inter-agency involvement is also apparent
in this situation. Auditors from Commission on
Audit (COA) and of course the municipal treasur-
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ers become accomplices in the process by seeing to
it that their illegal transactions are without loop-
holes. These practices of bribery are punishable by
law under Revised Penal Code, “Crime Committed
by Public Officers”, Chapter 2, Section 2, Article
210 which states that:
“Art. 210. Direct bribery. – Any public officer who
shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in
connection with the performance of his official duties,
in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present
received by such officer, personally or through the
mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prison
mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a
fine of not less than three times the value of the gift in
addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime
agreed upon, if the same shall have been committed.”
Aside from bribery, getting kickbacks from
projects, malversation of public funds, other forms
of corruption in the municipalities also exist.
Mayors and treasurers do not hold offices in their
respective municipalities. In fact, one treasurer
admitted that he had not been to his office for a
long time already yet he continues to collect his
monthly  salaries and personal shares of IRA. The
mayors also do not reside in their respective mu-
nicipalities but live in the nearby cities of Marawi,
Iligan or Cagayan de Oro as indicated by their
number of houses located in several cities in
Mindanao. Ghost employees and nepotism are also
common. Since the family and kin play a great role
in the election campaign, nepotism is a way by
which the mayors can repay the favour they owed
from their relatives. Debt of gratitude (utang na
loob) and deep sense of pride (maratabat) are values
that are strongly enshrined  in the Maranao
culture that demand strict adherence among the
informants.
According to the strain theory of Merton,
putting pressure on the individual to conform to
societal norms, or socially accepted goals  place the
individual to either  conform within the bounds of
societal structure or lead him to be in  the deviant
subculture (Merton, 1938). Therefore, the culture
and structure of the social context where the
informants live forced them to comply with soci-
etal expectations like  repaying debts of gratitude to
election supporters leading to patronage, adhering
to the principles of maratabat to preserve family
honor  and familistic ties  making way for nepo-
tism. To Merton, deviance is structurally  created
also because opportunities given to aspiring indi-
viduals who wish  to obtain socially desirable goods
are limited. Therefore, the mayors who resorted to
deviant acts like vote buying and bribery find
deviation to culturally approved norms  as the only
opportunities available to them in order to get
power. This process in itself justifies their inability
to deliver services to their constituents who be-
came their partners (having sold their votes  to the
candidates) in the deviant situations they commit-
ted. The culture of corruption that happened in
these municipalities is  a structurally induced
condition that can be traced upon the society itself.
6. MONEY LOST  TO CORRUPTION
This study also uncovers some estimates on the
money wasted   to corruption although the exact
figures  are not certain. In the release of IRA, the
mayors admitted to have  received an amount
ranging from 1.5 million to 3 million pesos
monthly up to their term of 3 years. However,
these  revelations  are  understated   because the
exact amount they get from the 20%  IRA is not
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given. At the earliest, the mayor who spent the
least  can already recover his election investment
within the period of one year after induction to
office.  Crude as this maybe, these  information
could provide an estimate as to  the magnitude of
corruption at the municipal  level which  illegally
drains  the local and national   financial resources.
According to the  report  presented by Transpar-
ency and Accountability Network last 2011, the
massive amount of money  wasted to corruption
was  estimated to be 12 billion dollars in the period
1995 to 2000 (http://www.scribd.com/doc/TAN-
Paper-on-Corruption-and-Anticorruption-in-the-
Philippines-March-2011).
7. EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION
The perceived effects of graft and corruption in
the municipalities  are perpetuation of nepotism,
failure to deliver basic social services such as health
services, safe water supply/water  system and low
level of education. Municipal development in all
forms are sluggish with the absence of employment
opportunities  for the rural folks. Although the
agricultural sector is considered good by all infor-
mants but public facilities such as roads still need
improvement or still  needed to be built. Municipal
halls are the priority projects of the mayors despite
the fact that these municipalities had long been
established for decades already.
8. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
The propositions of Homans especially the
stimulus proposition,  value proposition, success
proposition  are supported in this study. At the
personal level, the motivation  (stimulus)  of the
mayor to run for office is high despite the financial
cost it entails. However, the value attached to the
position of being a mayor symbolizes power and
family prestige which is  the pride ( maratabat) and
significant mark of  the  familistic and closely-knit
Maranao society.  Winning the position is a desired
goal. This has to be obtained either in the legal or
illegal means ( like vote buying or bribing the
COMELEC) with the financial and social  help of
the family and support groups. Getting back the
money ( through embezzlement, if not caught)
invested after winning the election is  justified as
an anticipated  reward ( Homans’ success proposi-
tion) in performing the act. Thus, the cycle of
corruption is the result of the endless desire to
obtain a goal or a  valued reward,  the  success of
getting  the reward, and the tendency to repeat the
rewarded action ( as there are no reported cases of
public officials in Lanao del Sur being sued and
imprisoned  for  involvement in corruption)
Also, Merton’s strain theory explains why under
circumstances of lack of access or opportunity, as in
the case of the mayor informant who used unap-
proved means to win or recoup election invest-
ment through corruption or repay the favour owed
from immediate family and social circles, the
person will find any possible means to obtain a
desired goal. Corruption, as a form of deviance, is
an indication of  a structurally induced behaviour
because of the culturally prescribed norms demand-
ing compliance.
9. POLICY AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
 The counter corruption approach employed by
the Philippine government to address corruption
problem is  that which A.T. Rafique Rahman (
cited by Carino, 1986) categorizes  as   ‘hesitant-
institutional’ which utilizes   institutional means to
eradicate   corruption through  constitutional ,
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legal,   organizational ( like anti-corruption bu-
reaus) legislative measures,  and procedures (Arce,
2001). However, the Philippines is not deficit in the
regulatory policies/laws and constitutionally inde-
pendent bodies that  address corruption problem
in the country. Sad to say, all these efforts are
reduced to mere formalities   since “clientelism and
bureaucratic  capture continue to characterize
governance institutions in the country” (Abad ,
2010). The weak bureaucratic operations exacer-
bated by a blurred distinction between public and
private divide  creates an environment conducive
to corruption. However, since public office is a
public trust,  the role of  citizens and   well-mean-
ing/responsible leaders  who have political are vital
in  eradicaing corruption.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Graft and corruption practices are prevalent in
the municipal  governments  studied  in Lanao Del
Sur.  Its pervasive nature starts at the time of
election where massive vote buying is considered
the way things are run in the province if a candi-
date wants to win despite governmental regulations
that make this act illegal. Intensive investments of
the candidates are poured during election period in
anticipation of getting the same from the munici-
pal treasury the moment they win. This would also
mean resorting to violence for power. The voters,
on the other hand, had already given their consent
to this act as it is the time of the political cycle
where they can also receive generous amount from
political candidates.
A big role is also performed by the family and
kin of the politicians from the period of candidacy
until the declaration of winners. The family pro-
vides social, political and monetary support during
campaign until the election-day and even when
there are post-election protests to be filed to the
COMELEC. The clannish nature of the Maranao
families in Lanao del Sur is a social capital that is
tapped by politicians because the larger and more
politically and economically advantaged the family
of a candidate is, the higher the probability of
winning during election. However this cultural
orientation also breeds patronage, clientelism,
reciprocity and nepotism because the politician has
to repay the favour he/she owed from kin. This is
notable in the recruitment of employees in the
town hall, economic priorities given to farmer
relatives, among others.
Corruption destroys the integrity and account-
ability of local governance and the prospect for
countryside development of the province since the
IRA of the municipality is now embezzled by the
political leaders. The role of democratic participa-
tion of the citizens could not also be relied upon as
they allowed themselves to default their privilege
the moment they sold their votes. Also, politics in
the province is governed by guns, gold and goons,
that is, the powerful and the rich are the ones who
entered politics and  are ready to wage violence
against each other. Poor civilians are indeed liter-
ally mute as they witness the struggle of power in
their municipalities.
 The type of graft and corruption practices
undertaken by the mayors and treasurers are
typically seen in the studies conducted so far about
corruption in the Philippines. The common
denominators of corruption are dishonesty and
fraud which are manifested in payroll padding,
falsification of documents, bribery, kickbacks,
malversation of funds, abuse in the release of IRA,
among others.  There is one notable form of
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corruption practice that the researchers had
documented. This is grave abuse of power of the
treasurers and politicians leading to extreme
governmental inefficiency in the province as they
do not report for  duty to discharge their functions
and getting the IRA for personal use  (embezzle-
ment). These practices blur the distinction between
private and public goods.  The corrupt officials are
not also  caught doing the act. Inter-agency connec-
tions and linkages who also get shares in the
amount corrupted (e.g. municipal treasures, ac-
countants, engineers) are partners in preparing/
facilitating blemish-free liquidation documents or
reports.
The government should strengthen persecution
of corrupt  individuals and institutions   through
lifestyle check monitoring. In the case of Lanao
del Sur,  elective and appointive officials should be
subjected  to lifestyle checks before , during or after
their terms to establish  cases of corruption and the
corresponding persecutory  actions to be meted
against the perpetrators..
Establishing a strong partnerships between the
government and civil society organizations is a
remarkable ground for expanding  public participa-
tion and monitoring of government transparen-
cies. Democratic partnership between the govern-
ment and the public is also a laudable endeavour
useful in instilling good citizenship. This collective
consciousness (Amorado, 2007) allows people to
develop sensitivities to  universal good especially
with respect to electing responsible leaders during
election. This partnership might abate incidence of
vote buying in election hot spot areas like Lanao
del Sur.
By developing a culture of efficiency in public
service, transparency in transactions and ethical
reforms, cultural breeders of corruption may
slowly lose its ground and influence.
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